While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.
Growing economic interconnectedness is a feature of the global business landscape. 1 Transnational commerce grows, even if at a slowed pace as compared to its pre-recession dynamic. 2 At the same time, there is no World Competition Court. Private anticompetitive conduct is not regulated within any broad, multilateral framework.
Competition laws remain predominantly national. 3 Extraterritoriality is the only tool of general availability allowing addressing anticompetitive harm caused by foreign entities operating abroad. 4 From this perspective the major practical challenge in enforcementoften the crux of the matter-is the issue of accessing foreign-based evidence.
Most antitrust proceedings outside the US are not judicial, but administrative in nature. This means that in transnational enforcement, rules of inter-agency cooperation (that is, cooperation between agencies/ authorities of different regimes enforcing competition rules) are of greater practical significance than the means of international judicial cooperation. 5 That said, the majority of existing cooperation agreements do not allow for sharing of confidential information, or providing assistance in obtaining evidence, 6 despite the fact that 'accessing relevant information is the lifeblood of competition enforcement'. 7 1 For detailed data on economic globalization see KOF Index of Globalization, <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>. 2 For some general thoughts on what type of challenges face multinational companies in the aftermath of the recent crisis see Ernst & Young, 'Looking Beyond the Obvious: Globalization and New Opportunities for Growth' (January 2013), <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Globalization_-_Looking_beyond_the_obvious/$FILE/LookingBeyondObvious.pdf>. 3 The terms antitrust and competition law are used in this article interchangeably. 4 While international cooperation in the field of antitrust is overall a success story, the 'worst part of the track record' 8 -as Judge Wood put it-is the lack of the development of inter-agency enforcement cooperation. This relates primarily to the very issue of information and evidence sharing, despite the numerous calls for greater collaboration in this regard. 9 In fact, in the recent international enforcement cooperation survey conducted by the Competition Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) many competition agencies acknowledged that legal limits preventing them from exchanging confidential information and evidence are the primary impediment to international cooperation. 10 Given the limitations of the international judicial assistance and the territorial nature of enforcement jurisdiction under international law, 11 the information sharing between competition authorities has an important role to play in narrowing down the existing enforcement gap. By enabling access to foreign-based evidence, such cooperation improves the effectiveness of reliance on extraterritorial application of domestic competition law. 12 In the longer term it could lead-through trust building-to a more multilateral response to challenges posed by transnational anticompetitive conduct.
This article offers an original contribution to the existing literature by identifying and critically evaluating the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential 8 Diane P. Wood, 'Soft Harmonizing among Competition Laws: Track Record and Prospects', 48 Antitrust Bulletin 305 (2003), at 315-16. 9 For example, within the OECD framework. See OECD, 'Hard Core Cartels. Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead ', 44, 47 (2003) . The case of merger review is somewhat different, since it is quite natural for merging parties to grant confidentiality waivers, allowing competition agencies to share and discus the submitted information, facilitating the review. For discussion of confidentiality waivers in this context and sample waivers forms see International Competition Network, 'Model Confidentiality Waiver' (2005), <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc330.pdf>. 10 International Enforcement Co-operation: Secretariat Report on the OECD/ICN Survey on International Enforcement Co-operation, above note 6, at 22-23. 11 Although the practices of states vary, the conservative view holds that under international law it is permitted merely to notify a foreign party in a foreign state about the proceedings in the forum. No command could be addressed to such a party; no threat of penalties for non-compliance can be imposed. See generally Frederick Alexander Mann, 'The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law', 111 Recueil des Cours 1, ch. IV (1964) . 12 Apart from that key effect, such cooperation helps to avoid contradictory outcomes and allows for more efficient allocation of scarce resources of agencies (by, for example, allowing to avoid duplication). This is particularly so when cooperating authorities investigate the same conduct. information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. It outlines the shortcomings of the current regulatory framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts even without any underlying bilateral agreement and also on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.
Part I of this article restates and appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, both in general and specifically from a competition law perspective. It also explores ways of their possible accommodation. Part II offers an overview of rules on confidentiality applicable to antitrust enforcement in the EU and in the US-two most influential competition law regimes. Part III identifies and evaluates the existing international (bilateral and plurilateral) and domestic instruments enabling sharing of confidential information between antitrust agencies. The conclusions call for following the Australian unilateral good practice-enabling, but not requiring, domestic agencies to share confidential information with foreign counterparts on a case-by-case basis and subject to necessary and appropriate safeguards.
I. CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING CONFIDENTIALITY AND EVIDENCE SHARING
The laws guarding confidentiality remain a considerable obstacle in furthering interagency cooperation in competition law enforcement. There are various, often important, reasons why certain types of information should be kept confidential. This part identifies the most commonly voiced concerns against inter-agency cooperation in this regard, looks into their validity and possible ways of their accommodation. 13 Firstly, it is often argued that the need to protect business secrets, commercially/business sensitive information requires stringent rules on confidentiality.
Business plans and strategies are of paramount importance from a firm's perspective.
Exchanges between agencies may lead to information being 'leaked' to companies in foreign jurisdictions for their benefit. 14 In response to this argument the US Department of Justice (DoJ) invited the business community to identify a case in which confidential business information shared between competition authorities has been misused or leaked to foreign competitors. So far no example has been identified. 15 Secondly, it is claimed that exchange of evidence between authorities could undermine leniency programmes. Many antitrust agencies introduced programmes which allow cartel members, especially whistleblowers, to benefit either from full or partial immunity 16 in exchange for reporting prohibited conduct and helping the agency investigate it. 17 Apart from the effects in particular cases, leniency programmes are a significant factor in destabilizing cartels and deterring their formation. In the context of inter-agency information sharing the argument is that such exchanges may lead to the 13 17 For example, under the EU leniency scheme an applicant may in certain circumstances benefit from full immunity from a fine. Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 11-22 (2006) , paras 8-13. On the EU and the US leniency programmes see Nicolo Zingales, 'European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards Convergence?', 5(1) Competition Law Review 5 (2008). cooperating firm being investigated in the other jurisdiction. The threat is that agencies may share inculpatory evidence. Therefore, such cooperation could undermine leniency programmes by impairing the incentives for cartels members to cooperate. 18 While this is a valid consideration, appropriate safeguards can be built in the cooperation arrangements to rule out this particular risk for leniency applicants. For example, the recent EU-Switzerland Cooperation Agreement explicitly rules out sharing of information provided under leniency programmes. 19 Moreover, in the EU there is no EU-wide leniency system. An application for leniency at the EU level is not an application for leniency in any of the Member States. Firms are encouraged to simultaneous submit applications to the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in those Member States whose markets were affected by the conduct in question. 20 That said, the Commission clarifies that information voluntarily submitted by an applicant will only be transmitted to an NCA with applicant's consent. 21 While the current intra-EU system of handling leniency applications is not free from difficulties, 22 it can serve as an example of a workable multi-jurisdictional approach toward inter-agency exchange of evidence, addressing the applicants concerns. However, given the highly integrated nature of the EU, this arrangement should be learnt from with caution.
Another argument raised against inter-agency evidence sharing is that such materials may be discoverable in recipient jurisdictions (either via rules on access to evidence or under the freedom of information legislation), exposing the firms involved to private actions for damages. The threat of discoverability could further undermine leniency programmes. This seems to be the reason why the US and EU leniency programmes 18 Chowdhury, above note 13, 13-15. 19 See below text accompanying notes 73-78. 20 Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 43-53 (2004), para 38. 21 Consent is not required only in three narrowly defined situations, in which the applicant is assured that no sanctions will be imposed upon him by the competition authority in the receiving jurisdiction. Id. at paras 40-41. 22 For discussion of the current leniency system in the EU, including its deficits, see Maria Jaspers, 'Designing a European Solution for a "One-Stop Leniency Shop"', 27(12) European Competition Law Review 685 (2006). allow now for oral applications. 23 Moreover, both the US and European competition authorities have a tradition of strongly protecting leniency related documents. 24 In the EU context discoverability of leniency applications was recently tested in Pfleiderer 25 and the Court of Justice did not preclude it. 26 It ruled that it is up to the national courts to decide on a case by case basis under which conditions to grant or refuse access under national law, by balancing the interests protected by EU law (effectiveness of leniency programmes being one of them 27 ). 28 While threat of discoverability of leniency documents is a challenge, it is not specific to inter-agency cooperation. The same issue arises when a disclosure order is addressed not to the competition authority, but to the leniency applicant itself in private enforcement actions at the national level. 29 It is also argued that inter-agency exchange of evidence may have negative impact on due process rights/ procedural fairness, especially in those jurisdictions in which anticompetitive conduct is subject to criminal sanctions. The high level of protection of 23 Compare Sweeney, above note 7, at 304. 24 In this case Pfleiderer, a German company-a purchaser of decor paper, wanted to bring a follow-on action after the Bundeskartellamt, the German NCA, fined a number of companies and individuals active on the decor paper manufacturing market for their violations of the EU competition law. Pfleiderer sought access to the case file and was dissatisfied with the limited access it was granted, looking for full access also to the leniency applications voluntarily submitted to the NCA under the German leniency scheme. The German district court hearing the case asked the ECJ for its guidance on where granting such access is in line with the EU law. Interestingly, AG Mazák in its Opinion distinguished between leniency applications and all other pre-existing documents submitted by the leniency applicant, considering that access to the former should not be in principle granted, whereas access to the latter should be allowed. 26 Pfleiderer, above note 25, at para 32. 27 It is noteworthy that for the first time the ECJ acknowledged that the functioning of leniency programmes is an interest protected by EU law. Id. at paras 25-27. Note that confidentiality is also a right protected under the EU Law. See below notes 47-59 and accompanying text. 28 Id. at paras 31-32. 29 Cauffman, above note 25, 12-13. due process rights applicable in criminal investigations may be undermined if materials collected for the purposes of civil investigation or administrative proceedings are passed on and then used in a criminal investigation. 30 This is a valid concern. The European There is also a mercantilistic argument against inter-agency evidence cooperation: the sharing of information by antitrust authorities is likely to lead to domestic companies being sanctioned in foreign jurisdictions, even when no harm has been caused by the investigated firms on their home markets. 33 This would negatively affect national welfare. Even in a case of an international cartel challenged in a number of jurisdictions, from the cartel's host state perspective the higher the foreign fines are, the higher is the outflow of wealth from the country and the more affected will be the fined 30 firm's competitive position (versus its foreign competitors). The tolerance of export cartels (agreements between competitors affecting only foreign markets) in virtually all jurisdictions is the best example that such mercantilistic considerations are present. 34 Yet this is a short-sighted approach. Firstly, it is a double-edged sword since a state that is unwilling to share information should expect similar, reciprocal reaction of other states. Secondly, such a mercantilistic approach, if followed persistently, may have negative spillover effects beyond competition law, potentially affecting the state's foreign relations. Furthermore, such thinking presupposes that private capital (the challenged firm) will be in some way 'faithful' to the host state. This need not to be so and often it is not the case. Multinational firms often slice and relocate production processes internationally, use transfer-pricing and other tools to optimize (that is, minimize) their tax obligations in any given state.
Finally and in more general terms, the issue of close inter-agency cooperation raises concerns about sovereignty. Sharing of evidence facilitates extraterritorial enforcement of foreign antitrust laws, which may be considered-either generally or in a particular case-as encroaching on sovereignty of the affected state. 35 35 In similar vein Judge Wood, when commenting on the benefits of inter-agency cooperation, notes 'I would not expect one country to assist another in pursuing a case that the first country regarded as an impermissible effort at extraterritorial regulation'. Compare Diane P. Wood, 'Is Cooperation Possible', 34 New England Law Review 103 (1999), at 108-09. 36 For discussion of blocking legislation see Marek Martyniszyn, 'Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order', 37(1) World Competition 103 (2014). At the same time none of the above concerns regarding inter-agency confidential information sharing rules out cooperation. Many of them can be addressed by suitable safeguards or procedural arrangements. For example, the need for protection of important national interests may be addressed by a provision allowing for a refusal of cooperation in cases of particularly high political importance, while allowing for cooperation in all other cases. The appropriate caveats concerning protection of individual procedural justice can be explicitly provided for in cooperation agreements.
Some arguments, like the one concerning business secrets, while intuitively appealing, are unsubstantiated. The object of exchange between agencies in this context is not 'the secret formula for Coca-Cola', a trade secret, but the proof of antitrust violation. 37 Moreover, while under merger review the authorities are likely to analyse business sensitive information such as strategies or future plans (prospective focus of review), historic information (retrospective data) is the focus of cartel investigations. 38 Investigators are looking for, for example, evidence of meetings or communications between firms, regarding pricing, markets, or sales policies. In practice such evidence is often found in handwritten notes, calendars entries, phone logs, and does not address important prospective business strategy. 39 As Matsushita rightly points out, if exchange of evidence could have been achieved, for example, in tax law (for instance, under the US-Japan Tax Treaty), it should be possible also in competition law. 40 This effectively debunks what Hammond calls one of the myths and misconceptions concerning inter-agency information sharing. He argues that there is no reason why antitrust violations should be treated differently from 37 Hammond, above note 15, 4-5. 38 Id. at 5. 39 Id. 40 Mitsuo Matsushita, 'International Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Policy', 1 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 463 (2002), at 473. deceit or fraud. 41 The issue of competition law criminalization aside, 42 it is difficult not to agree with Hammond's argument.
Nevertheless, the lack of a widespread mechanism allowing for close cooperation between agencies, as Judge Wood notes, 43 means that: (1) states value 'sovereign prerogatives above the added benefits for competition law enforcement', and
(2) companies are satisfied with the reality in which the antitrust authorities 'must operate with one hand tied behind their back'. There should be no doubt that companies suffer harm from anticompetitive conduct. While many may try to pass on the harm to their customers (and ultimately consumers) by raising prices, this will not always happen, especially on very competitive markets. Therefore there is no reason why legally compliant businesses should not favour information sharing arrangements between agencies. 44
II. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY: THE EU AND US PERSPECTIVES
At the international level there is no common definition of confidential information. 45 Definitions and standards of protection differ between jurisdictions. In the EU confidentiality is protected by provisions of both primary and secondary EU law. Furthermore, under the Commission's Staff Regulation 52 any unauthorized disclosure of information is prohibited, unless that information has already been made public or is accessible to the public. 53 The officials are bound by this prohibition also after leaving the service for the Commission. 54 In case of damage caused by a breach of confidentiality in violation of the aforementioned provisions by the Commission's staff 46 Moreover, the Cooperation Agreement underlined that neither Party was required to provide the other Party any information which disclosure was prohibited under the law of the requested Party. 67 The net effect of the Agreement in terms of information exchange is that the agencies can share confidential information only if the source of the information explicitly grants a waiver. 68 However, there are other agreements and even unilateral arrangements, which provide for sharing of confidential information between agencies. These are discussed in the following part. 61 Rule 6(e)(3) lists expectations allowing for disclosure of grand jury materials, and although there is little precedent in this regard it seems that none of exceptions would apply in case of a request from a foreign competition agency. American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, International Antitrust Cooperation Handbook (ABA, Section of Antitrust Law, 2004) 26-28. 62 'Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure …, and no such information or documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding.' 15 U.S.C. Section 18(a)(h), as amended by the Hart Scott-Rodino Act of 1976. 63 '… the Commission shall not have any authority to make public any trade secret or any commercial or financial information which is obtained from any person and which is privileged or confidential, except that the Commission may disclose such information to officers and employees of appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies or to any officer or employee of any State law enforcement agency upon the prior certification of an officer of any such Federal or State law enforcement agency that such information will be maintained in confidence and will be used only for official law enforcement purposes. 65 Art. III of the 1995 Cooperation Agreement, above note 64. 66 Id. at Art. IX. The Positive Comity Agreement did not introduce any changes in this regard. 67 Such a disclosure is also not required if it would be incompatible with important interests of the Party possessing the information. Compare Art. VIII(1) of the Cooperation Agreement, above note 64. 68 Chowdhury, above note 13, 9.
III. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ALLOWING FOR EXCHANGE OR SHARING OF EVIDENCE
Generally sharing of confidential information between agencies transnationally is possible only when special rules to that end have been adopted. The intra-EU framework in that regard is the most far-reaching one. It allows NCAs to exchange evidence, and also to carry out inspections and other fact-finding measures for other NCAs. Apart from this unique intra-EU arrangement, there are few legal instruments (bilateral or plurilateral), allowing for confidential information sharing. Besides these special tools legislation of a few states (most notably of Australia, Canada, and UK)
permits, under certain circumstances, their competition authorities to share confidential information unilaterally (without any specific agreement in that regard). 69 In this part such international and domestic solutions will be identified and evaluated from the perspective of their practical relevance in transnational competition law enforcement.
The attention is first turned towards the special intra-EU framework. (Edward Elgar, 2006 ). In the aftermath of criminalization of competition law the pre-existing extradition treaties become a potentially powerful tool in antitrust enforcement. This issue was at the heart of the Norris case. In 2002, in connection with a US antitrust investigation in a carbon components manufacturing cartel, two UK-based subsidiaries of one of the US companies involved pleaded guilty to counts of tampering with witnesses and documents destruction. The US grand jury indicted Ian Norris, the former CEO of one of the subsidiaries, on obstruction of justice and price-fixing counts. The US DoJ sought to extradite Norris to the US under the US-UK Extradition Treaty. This attempted initially failed. In 2008 the House of Lords held that price fixing was not considered a crime in the UK at the time in question (that is before the introduction of the cartel offence in the UK in 2003), and the US-UK Extradition Treaty required double criminality. Yet, the Lords had left the question open whether Norris could be extradited on the ground of the obstruction of justice. The lower courts allowed for extradition on this basis (later affirmed by the UK Supreme Court). In March 2010, after the ECtHR rejected Norris' appeal on human rights grounds, the UK extradited Norris to stand trial in the US. For the US DoJ Antitrust Division it was the first time to succeed in seeking extradition of a foreign national. In 2010 Norris was found guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice. He was sentenced to serve eighteen months in prison. The Norris case brought the extradition issue into the limelight for the antitrust audience, although its impact is rather limited. Most extradition treaties contain the double criminality requirement. Some older treaties list extraditable offences, but the cartel offence is not to be found on such lists. Moreover, some jurisdictions do not extradite their own citizens (for example Germany), or retain discretion in this regard (for example Australia). In effect, it seems that extradition on competition law grounds can effectively take place only among the US, the UK, Ireland, and Canada. See The Act was intended to improve access to foreign-based evidence in civil antitrust cases, including information collected by the agencies through their own investigatory powers. 98 The IAEAA created a framework under which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DoJ are empowered to negotiate antitrust mutual assistance agreements 93 Id. at Art. 5(1)(b). 94 Waller, above note 89, at 368. 95 For example, Section 29 of the Canadian Competition Act provides for rigid confidentiality protection. Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34, <http://canlii.ca/t/krnt>. The Canadian legislation implementing the US-Canada MLAT, in its Section 3(1), provides that the provisions of the Act override provisions of other statutes but for those which prohibit the disclosure of information or prohibit disclosure of information except under certain conditions. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, RSC 1985, c 30 (4th Supp), <http://canlii.ca/t/hz0l>. In practice it means that Canadian authorities cannot share with US counterparts information obtained in their own investigations. This has no impact on passing on information obtained pursuant to requests under the MLAT as that is a separate procedure not falling under the confidentiality requirement of the Competition Act. 96 See above note 61 and accompanying text. 97 15 U.S.C. Sections 6201-6212. 98 The IAEAA defines antitrust evidence broadly as encompassing 'information, testimony, statements, documents, or other things that are obtained in anticipation of, or during the course of, an investigation or proceeding under any of the Federal antitrust laws or any of the foreign antitrust laws.' 15 U.S.C. Section 6211(1).
(AMAAs) allowing for exchange of confidential information 99 on a mutual basis (a condition sine qua non) with foreign counterparts, while preserving its confidentiality. 100 Exchange of information under AMAAs applies to criminal, civil and merger matters. The assistance may be provided regardless of whether the conduct in question violates US antitrust laws. 101 Apart from sharing information, the US agencies may actively use their powers to gather evidence for the use by foreign counterparts. 102 Moreover, on an application of the Attorney General a US district court may order a person to, for example, give testimony or a statement in a particular form, including under oath. 103 These provisions explicitly allow for taking evidence in line with foreign procedures (so long as they are in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), 104 addressing admissibility of so-obtained evidence in foreign proceedings.
The IAEAA makes an exception to US rules governing confidentiality and enables the US agencies to share information obtained through civil investigative demands with signatories of AMAAs. 105 Moreover, provisions of the IAEAA expand the list of exceptions allowing for disclosure of grand jury materials, regardless of whether the foreign competition laws are civil, criminal, or administrative in nature, so long as the foreign authority shows 'a particularized need' for such disclosure. 106 The first and only agreement adopted under the IAEAA 107 was entered into between the US and Australia in 1999. 108 It follows the spirit of the IAEAA and commits both Parties to offer each other assistance and cooperate in providing and obtaining antitrust evidence. 109 The said assistance includes disclosure and exchange of evidence, taking testimonies, obtaining documentary evidence, as well as executing searches and seizures. 110 The US-Australia Agreement has been availed of at least once by Australia in its investigation of the Vitamins cartel. 111 It is unclear if that was the same or another case but the Australian authorities report gaining access, under the Agreement, to US grand jury materials, which proved very useful in the Australian investigation. 112
While the IAEAA created a new framework for cooperation agreements, it seems that other states would benefit little from entering into AMAAs with the US. Firstly, apart from the EU there was, at least in past, little appetite for extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws. Entering into an AMAA with the US (whose laws provide for far-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction and whose antitrust agencies have the necessary capacity to avail of it) could be seen as simply allowing the US agencies to reach for foreign firms with little benefit offered in return, and at considerable sunk costs (involved in the negotiation of the agreement). Secondly, foreign parties to a large extent already have access to US-based evidence thanks to means of international 107 Federal Trade Commission, 'First International Antitrust Assistance Agreement Under New Law Announced By FTC And DOJ' (17 April 1997), <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/iaeaa.shtm>. Waller notes that after the IAEAA entered into force the US antitrust agencies started talks with the Canadian government with an aim to conclude an AMAA. This was the logical step, taking into consideration the close cooperation between authorities under the existing MLAT. Yet such an AMAA between the US and Canada has not been signed. Waller, above note 89, at 373-74. 108 1-22 (2004) . 115 Since Australia entered into the Agreement with the US, the Australian authorities must have considered it a beneficial step. Allan Asher, then the Acting Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission noted that the Agreement will help the ACCC to address challenges posed by international cartels. He also pointed out that the Agreement would assist the Commission in dealing with the increasing numbers of mergers at the global level.
ACCC The Australian-New Zealand relationship was initially asymmetrical. The situation begun to change with the passing of the Commerce (International Co-operation, and Fees) Amendment Act 2012. 132 The Act authorizes the NZCC to provide investigative assistance to and to share confidential information (also compulsorily obtained) with foreign counterparts. It contains numerous safeguards, for example, ruling out cooperation if it was to harm New Zealand's international trade interests. 133 It also prevents from sharing of any statements made to the NZCC, if that could lead to incrimination of the statements' author, unless the foreign counterpart provides written assurances that it will not happen. 134 This new regulatory framework differs from the Australian regime, inter alia, by requiring that an intergovernmental or inter-agency agreement is in place prior to any such cooperation. 135 Due to that later requirement and in order to balance out cooperation capacity in April 2013 the NZCC entered into new Cooperation Arrangement with the ACCC (without prejudice to the 2007 Cooperation Agreement). 136 The Arrangement contains all the safeguards laid down in the recent New Zealand's legislation and it is so far the only one within that framework. 137 It makes the bilateral cooperation more even. Rod Sims, the ACCC Chairman, rightly reflected that the Australian-New Zealand relationship benefits from 'probably the most complete set of cooperation arrangements cases an Australian court may, if that is more convenient or fair, conduct proceedings or deliver the judgment in New Zealand (the same applies the other way round). 139 While this case of bilateral cooperation is exemplary, the unilateral approach of Australia deserves special attention and recognition. Section 155AAA of the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010, appears one of the most (if not the most) liberal legal frameworks worldwide governing evidence sharing. The ACCC can share confidential information, both provided to the ACCC in confidence or gathered by the authority itself, with 'a foreign government body' to assist it in its performance or execution of its functions. 140 The notion of the foreign government body is defined broadly and it includes competition authorities irrespective of their character (administrative v. law enforcement agency) or their reach (regional, national, supranational). 141 Since provisions of Section 155AAA do not require reciprocity as a precondition for disclosure, the ACCC may share confidential information with antitrust agencies which would not be able to offer comparable assistance. This type of national provisions allowing competition agency to share confidential information-without the consent of the source-with foreign counterparts are often called "information gateways". 142 Upon a formal request from a foreign body it is up to the ACCC Chairman whether to disclose the information. 143 The Chairman may 'impose conditions to be complied with in relation to protected information disclosed'. 144 While the Section 155AAA itself does not list factors which should be considered, regard may be given to: 145 disclosure may discourage informants from providing information in the future. The later factor is reinforced in the ACCC's immunity policy. 146 Except as required by law, ACCC will not share confidential information without informant's consent.
Australian authorities consider that sharing confidential information in assistance to foreign investigations 'benefits Australia as the effects of a cartel can often extend beyond a single country's borders.' 147 From this perspective Australia stands out as an example of a jurisdiction which not only managed to address concerns relating to confidential information sharing, but went beyond the limits of traditional public international law approach to international commitments by creating a framework allowing the ACCC to assist foreign counterparts in their investigations irrespective of whether they would be able to reciprocate.
Without getting involved in bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, Australia introduced a regime-an information gateway-which allows the ACCC to share confidential information with counterparts, on a case-by-case basis. This is a model solution.
Australia-based entities considering anticompetitive strategies have good reasons to be alarmed. If the Australian example is followed, the international community could experience a radical improvement in the fight against transnational anticompetitive conduct (especially in cases where there is an international consensus as to the harmful nature of the conduct at stake). 148 146 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct' (2011), <http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Immunity%20policy%20for%20cartel%20conduct%20and%20interpretation% 20guidelines.pdf>, para 63.
147 Id. at para 11. 148 Davies, the Head of the OECD Competition Division, cautions that in case of younger competition agencies introduction of information gateways might lessen business confidence in the treatment of confidential information by agencies in such jurisdictions. John Davies, 'Contribution to Roundtable on: Modalities and Procedures for International Cooperation in Competition Cases involving more than one Country' (UNCTAD 13th Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, 8-10 July 2013), 6, <http://www.unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/IGE2013_RT1_OECD_en.pdf>. This concern seems particularly valid with regard to potential impact on domestic leniency programs. That said, domestic legislation can rule out sharing of leniency materials to address this issue.
Assisting foreign counterparts may of course absorb agency's scarce resources. This need not be a predicament to cooperation. There is no reason why the requesting agency should not be asked to cover the costs of assistance incurred by the requested authority. 149 The recent New Zealand's legislation explicitly empowers the NZCC to request foreign counterparts to cover such costs. 150
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Despite increasingly transnational nature of commerce, competition laws remain predominantly national. Enforces often have to pursue foreign violators. In such transnational cases access to foreign-based evidence poses a great, frequently insurmountable, practical challenge. Most competition authorities are not empowered to share confidential information/ evidence with foreign counterparts, or assist them in that regard.
Various concerns are being voiced against such close inter-agency cooperation. As discussed, some of them are valid. Yet, none rule out confidential information sharing as such. This paper argued that necessary and appropriate safeguards can be introduced to accommodate legitimate worries. In some cases cooperation may not be possible, for example, due to important state interests involved. Given the harmful nature of anticompetitive conduct, such cases are an exception, not the rule. discussed-the scope of this phenomenon from a global perspective is limited. In most cases when the special regime explicitly allowing for disclosure has not been introduced, domestic laws governing confidentiality block any exchanges of confidential materials between the cooperation-oriented agencies. 
